The helideck structure must satisfy the safety requirements associated with various environmental and accidental loads. Especially, there have been a number of fire accidents offshore due to helicopter collision (take-off and/or landing) in recent decades. To prevent further accidents, a substantial amount of effort has been directed toward the management of fire in the safety design of offshore helidecks. The aims of this study are to introduce and apply a procedure for quantitative risk assessment and management of fires by defining the fire loads with an applied example. The frequency of helicopter accidents are considered, and design accidental levels are applied. The proposed procedures for determining design fire loads can be efficiently applied in offshore helideck development projects.
Introduction
Helicopters are the primary modes of transport for offshore platforms. They carry people, equipment and necessities to offshore installations. Unlike other transport, such as ships, helicopters take off and land on offshore installations. The offshore structures can therefore be damaged by helicopter accidents.
Many helicopter accidents (referred to as heli-accidents in this paper) have been reported over the last ten years (OGP, 2010a) . Fig. 1 shows examples of heli-accidents on offshore platforms.
The frequency of heli-accidents is lower than for other events (explosions, fires, collisions or dropped objects), but they do also have the potential risk factor of fires, as combustibles, in the form of highly volatile fuel in fuel tanks, are always present in helicopters.
If a heli-accident occurs on a helideck, fuel can leak from the tank. Released fuel can cause a pool fire, which can structurally damage the helideck. API (2006) and DNV (2001) recommend that fire safety facilities such as fire extinguishers, water sprays, fire resistant equipment, etc. are installed to prevent such structural damage. Also, SOLAS (2015) suggests the fire-fighting appliances regarding categories in Regulation 18 (Helicopter facilities).
There are, however, only recommendations for fire suppression facilities in the rules and standards, and the guidelines for structural safety designs to fire fighting and the definition of design fire loads are weak.
In particular, a helideck made from aluminum is sensitive to temperature and heat flux, compared with other materials such as carbon steel, stainless steel, nickel alloy, etc. A structural design for aluminum helidecks that specifically addresses the risk of fires is therefore necessary and should be developed.
There has been extensive research into the fire risk assessment and management of topside structures on offshore installations (Spouge, 1999; Vinnem, 2007; Paik and Czujko, 2009 , 2010 , 2011 , 2012 Paik et al., 2013) . In addition, structural safety assessment of topside structure considering fire accidents is performed by Yanlin and Jang (2015) . In spite of these efforts, different approach for helidecks is needed (Vinnem, 2007) .
The aims of this study are to (i) introduce and (ii) apply a procedure for quantitative fire risk assessment and management for helidecks on offshore installations, and to (iii) define the design fire loads for helicopter collisions on helidecks, with applied examples.
In the present study, credible fire scenarios are selected in the procedure, and a reasonable accident acceptance level for helidecks is suggested, to help define design fire loads to ensure the structural safety of aluminum helidecks in case of fires.
A procedure for quantitative fire risk assessment and management
Unlike the prescriptive procedures associated with rules, standards or qualitative risk assessment and management (Paik and Czujko, 2012) , the procedure for Quantitative Risk Assessment and Management (QRA&M) for fires on offshore platforms proposed by Paik et al. (2013) efficiently evaluates risks and defines the design loads. Fig. 2 illustrates a procedure for the quantitative risk assessment and management of offshore installations in case of fires. The procedure can be applied to the risk assessment of helidecks, and is used in this study.
The procedure for QRA&M in fire accidents, as shown in Fig. 2 , can be divided into eight steps, described in detail in Table 1 . In application of risk acceptance criteria, As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) risks such as fire loads, structural response, etc. can be adopted.
In this study, steps 1e5 (not the entire procedure) are carried out to obtain a fire exceedance curve, which can define the design fire loads of helidecks.
The partial procedure carried out applies a (i) probabilistic method to select scenarios, (ii) computational fluid dynamics (CFD) to obtain fire loads and (iii) historical data to calculate the fire frequency. 
Selection of credible fire scenarios on helidecks
When selecting credible fire accident scenarios, all possible parameters that can have an effect on fire loads should be considered, such as temperature, heat flux, flame length, etc. Fires can also be affected by wind (direction and speed) and leak (rate, direction, duration and position).
In the case of a jet fire, the scenarios should take into account the leak rate, direction, duration and position associated with the release. The characteristics of a pool fire, however, mean that only the operation parameters of leak amount and position are required. Table 6 Re-categorized index of leak amount for probability density distribution. In this study, the four parameters (i) wind direction, (ii) wind speed, (iii) leak amount and (iv) leak position are considered when selecting the scenarios, as fires caused by heli-accidents are similar to pool fires.
Wind direction and speed
Unlike ships that travel around the world, offshore platforms operate in a fixed, specific location. The metocean characteristics of the specific ocean can therefore be used for the risk assessment of offshore helidecks. Fig. 3 and Table 2 present the wind direction (wind rose) and the metocean data, which in this applied example are the probability of wind direction and speed in the ocean of West Africa.
As the original (raw) data are discontinuous, they must be converted to continuous functions so that a probabilistic approach can be used. Best-fit analysis should be conducted before the probability density function (PDF) is defined. Figs. 4e5 show the PDFs of wind direction and speed. The best-fitted function for wind direction is normal distribution, and for speed is Weibull distribution.
Leak amount
Calculating a leak amount is difficult, as helicopter accidents on offshore platforms are extremely rare, and the capacities of helicopter fuel tanks and engines are all different.
Several assumptions (type of helicopter and/or fuel, the location of the offshore platforms, the amount of fuel in the tank, etc.) must therefore be made.
Two assumptions are made in this study: first, that one type of fuel is used in the helicopters, and two, that they have a full fuel condition when they depart from land.
The leak amounts given in the study are calculated using the following steps: 1) Definition of helicopter (type of fuel) 2) Investigation of helicopter characteristics (capacity of fuel tank, mileage, etc.) 3) Definition of fuel condition on the land (a full condition is assumed) 4) Calculation of the distance between the land and the offshore installation 5) Calculation of the minimum required fuel from the land to the offshore installation 6) Calculation of the remaining fuel in the helicopter, which will be the leak amount
To obtain the leak amount, a helicopter with JP-8 fuel type, which is generally used in offshore installations, is assumed. The specifications of the helicopter are given in Table 3 .
To investigate the air-line distance between the land and offshore installations, the ocean regions of Brazil and West Africa, where many platforms are installed, are considered. Fig. 6 shows offshore platforms in the ocean regions of Brazil and West Africa, and the shortest radius from offshore to land, as the shortest distance is generally preferred.
After investigating the distance from the land in Fig. 6 , the minimum amount of fuel required to the platforms, and the remaining amount of fuel when the helicopter arrives at the platforms can be calculated. These are shown in Table 4 . The remaining fuel is then considered as the leak amount. Table 5 shows the probability of the leak amount. It is difficult to make a PDF (normal, Weibull distribution function, etc.), so it is re-categorized, as shown in Table 6 , to generate the normal distribution function. Fig. 7 illustrates the histogram and PDF of the recategorized leak amount, used to select fire scenarios.
Leak position
The leak position in the topside structure is relevant to processing units such as pipes, equipment, vessels, etc., and the crash areas are considered as leak positions on the helideck. However, this area cannot be exactly defined due to the small amount of historical data available.
It is therefore assumed that helicopter accidents on helidecks of offshore platforms occur evenly across the entire helideck. Fig. 8 presents a regular octagon helideck, applied as the target structure in this study, and divided into areas so the histogram and PDF can be obtained. Table 7 and Fig. 9 show the probability of each section, a histogram and the normal distribution function of the leak positions.
Selection of fire scenarios
Various sampling methods, such as Monte Carlo Simulations (MSC) (Rubinstein, 1981) , standard random sampling (Rubinstein, 1981) , stratified sampling (Czujko, 2001) , Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) (Ye, 1998) , etc. are used for selecting the scenarios. Of these sampling techniques, LHS can efficiently reduce the number of scenarios and have an accuracy with a number of scenarios less than MSC (Czujko, 2001) .
Figs. 10 and 11 present the scheme of the LHS technique and the method for defining the representative value.
In the study, using the Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) technique, 50 fire scenarios are selected with PDFs (wind direction, wind speed, leak amount and leak position), as shown in Table 8 for an applied example. The center of each section is defined as a leak position.
Fire CFD simulations

Modeling of fire CFD simulations
To obtain the fire loads, the Kameleon FireEX (KFX, 2014) CFD tool is used. KFX generates control volumes (grids) Fig. 13 . Location of numbered monitoring points to investigate fire loads.
automatically or by user, in association with the leak amount and/or the leak hole size. Fig. 12 shows the target structure, which is the helideck, the extent of analysis and the applied grids in KFX. The total number of control volumes is 1,800,000.
As mentioned in Section of Leak amount, it is assumed that one type of helicopter fuel (JP-8) is used. Table 9 shows the gas compositions of the JP-8 fuel type.
Obtaining the fire loads
KFX provides the fire loads at 1000 monitoring points. In this study, 96 points are used to obtain the fire loads.
The fire loads, such as temperature, heat flux, flame length, etc. differ according to the height from the heat source. Three elevations (0.05, 0.50 and 1.00 m from the heat source) are therefore selected to investigate the fire loads. Fig. 13 illustrates the location of monitoring points at three elevations ( Fig. 13(a) ). A point is located at the geometric center of each section. Fig. 14 shows examples of the simulation results. Fig. 14(a) presents the temperature of scenario 15 at three elevations. The temperature at the elevation nearest to the heat source is higher than the others.
Results of fire CFD simulations
Scenario 39, as presented in Fig. 14(b) , has a pool fire at section 15 (shown in Fig. 8 and Table 8 ). In the first 30 s after ignition, the temperature at point 71 is very high compared with the other points, but then reduces and is similar to that at monitoring point 77. This is due to the effect of wind at both points. Fig. 15 illustrates the effect of the variables wind direction, wind speed, and leak amount on the maximum temperature of the entire monitoring region. It shows that the wind speed has a remarkable effect on the fire loads, compared with other variables. With a wind speed of over 6 m/s, the temperature is similar to room temperature.
Calculation of fire frequency
To generate a fire exceedance curve, both fire load and fire frequency are required. The fire frequency can be calculated by Eq. (1).
where, F Fire ¼ fire frequency, F Release ¼ leak frequency and P Ignition ¼ ignition probability.
Leak (accidental) frequency
OGP (2010a) provides historical data of heli-accidents on offshore platforms. Table 10 presents the frequency of heliaccidents according to areas. In the present study, frequencies of phase in take-off and landing are considered, as a leak from a heli-accident can occur during either. A fuel release is assumed for all accidents.
For comparison, frequencies in the North Sea and in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) are applied. Therefore, the resulting frequencies of 8.6E-9/yr (4.3E-7/(yr$50), North Sea) and 5.4E-8/yr (2.7E-6/(yr$50), GOM) are equally used for leak (accidental) frequency in each fire scenario.
Ignition probability
The probability of ignition for fires from helicopter accidents has not been sufficiently investigated, but in this study it must be taken into account, so the 'offshore FPSO liquid model' suggested by OGP (2010b) is adopted. This model can be applied to the release of flammable liquids that do not have any significant flash fraction (10% or less) within offshore process modules or decks on FPSOs (OGP, 2010b). Fig. 16 presents the ignition probability according to the leak rate.
If an accident occurs, the fuel spills out of the tank in a very short time, so the total leak amount is considered as the release rate, shown in Fig. 16 , to calculate the ignition probability. From Fig. 16, 0 .028 of initiation probability is used for all 50 fire scenarios. Fig. 16 . Ignition probability relevant to release rate (OGP, 2010b).
Fire frequency
As shown in Eq. (1), fire frequency is calculated by leak frequency and ignition probability. Table 11 shows the leak frequency, ignition probability and fire frequency of heliaccidents in the North Sea and the GOM.
Design accidental loads for fires on helidecks of offshore installations
The fire load exceedance curve can be generated from the fire frequency and fire loads, and design accidental loads are obtained from this curve. The maximum temperature exceedance curve is adopted to define the design accidental load.
Figs. 17e19 present the maximum temperature exceedance curves at elevations A, B and C, which are derived from the study.
As shown in Fig. 14(a) , the temperature exceedance curve at elevation A has the highest value, compared with that of the air (B and C). This means that the structure, which is the helideck, is exposed to the highest temperature in the accidents. The structure should have sufficient strength to withstand the fire loads.
Helicopter accidents in the Gulf of Mexico are more frequent than in the North Sea. Consequently, the exceedance level in the GOM is almost 10 times that of the North Sea. This suggests that a design for an offshore helideck in a specific ocean area cannot be applied to one in a different area, and that offshore helidecks installed in the GOM need to be stronger for safety.
Helicopter crashes on offshore platforms are rare, so the exceedance level is very much lower than for other accidents, such as explosions, fires, collisions, groundings, etc. (Vinnem, 2007) . Different design accidental levels should therefore be adopted for the structural designs of helidecks regarding fires. Table 12 shows examples of the defined design fire loads for helideck. 10 À8 /yr of risk accepted load level proposed by Vinnem (2007) is adopted. It can be seen that the 10 À8 /yr of risk level is practical for risk assessment against the heli-accident.
Conclusions
Helicopter crashes on helidecks are rare events, but there is still a risk of helidecks being exposed to fire loads from pool fires that result from heli-accidents. Defining design fire loads is therefore important for safety, and structural design should take into account design loads obtained through risk assessment.
Defining design fire loads for the safe design of helidecks on offshore platforms is not easy, as there is insufficient historical data of heli-accidents.
The aims of this study are to suggest a procedure for defining the design fire accidental loads for aluminum helideck safety, and to carry out a procedure with an applied example.
In the study, it is inevitable that assumptions were needed in the selection of scenarios, and 50 credible accidental fire (pool fire) scenarios were selected, with several assumptions, using the Latin Hypercube sampling technique. The characteristics of fire loads and temperature exceedance curves were investigated. Table 11 Leak frequency, ignition probability and fire frequency.
Leak frequency (/yr) Ignition probability Fire frequency (/yr) North Sea GOM North Sea GOM 8.6E-9 5.4E-08 2.8E-2 2.4E-10 1.5E-9
Fig. 17. Probability exceedance curves of maximum temperature at elevation A. Fig. 18 . Probability exceedance curves of maximum temperature at elevation B. The conclusions of this study are as follows:
-The temperature at elevation A (structure), the nearest elevation to the heat source, is higher than at the other elevations. -Helidecks of offshore platform located in the Gulf of Mexico require stronger designs than those located in the North Sea. -Less than 10 À8 /yr (at the GOM) and/or 10 À9 /yr (at the North Sea) of risk accepted load levels should be considered when determining fire accidental loads for aluminum safety helidecks on offshore platforms, in the rare event of a heli-accident.
